I am currently working as a researcher in the Department of Economics at Uppsala University. I have received a PhD in Economics from the University of Washington in Summer of 2009. My general research interests are in the area of labor economics, applied microeconomics, applied econometrics and public economics. My dissertation consists of diverse set of topics in family economics, ranging from early contraception behavior and marriage to intra-household allocation problems after divorce. Please use the links below for more information on my current research, my teaching profile, and my CV. The best way to reach me is by email gblazys [at] gmail.com.
Curriculum Vitae
You can find my current CV here.
Dissertation
“Essays on the Economics of the Life Course” Abstract
Child Support Payments and Non-Compliance Cost: Does It Matter whether Money Comes from the Wallet or from the Purse? Access pdf here.
In this paper I look at a sample of divorced fathers who formed new partnerships. I use their child support payment information to test the so-called “Income pooling” hypothesis, which is implied by the Unitary Household Decision model. Under the Unitary model household expenditures on the husband’s children from his previous marriage should not be affected by intra-household income distribution. However, the new partner will likely receive less Utility from such expenditures, so her or his income will have a different effect on child support payments if partners’ relative incomes affect their bargaining power. Although there is a great variation in fathers’ payment behaviors over years, and a large fraction of fathers do not pay any child support, a significant proportion of fathers do actually pay what is specified by their court agreement. Therefore, I jointly model the father’s decision to comply with child support orders and voluntary payment amounts to account for fathers who are simply paying what is ordered by court. My estimates indicate that higher share of the father’s income in the household income increases the amount child support payments. This finding rejects income pooling and is consistent with Family Bargaining models. However, the differential effect of the father’s income declines when controlling for individual heterogeneity in Random Effects regression, and it completely disappears in Fixed Effects Specification. Alternative explanations are suggested.
Oral Contraceptives and Men Labor Market Outcomes: Where is the Power of the Pill coming from? Access pdf here.
This paper analyzes the methodological problems which occur when trying to evaluate long term effects of early life cycle events. This usually requires the researcher to take into account individual’s aging, time variation and (sometimes) birth cohort effects. By utilizing empirical specifications used in the previous literature to estimate the effects for women, we analyze how availability of improved birth control technology affected men’s versus women’s labor market experiences. We show how different parameter restrictions lead to very different estimation results. Moreover, we use Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate that significant Pill effects for men can be to a large extent explained by the bias in the estimated coefficients. We show that arbitrary restrictions imposed to achieve identification of age, period and cohort effects may not only produce nonsensical estimates of these variables, but they also affect other parameters of interest, in this case, the estimated effect of the Pill. We provide some general recommendations on how to minimize the potential biases when one faces similar identification problems.
Intelligence, Personality and Marital Outcomes. Access pdf here.
This paper explores the impact of cognitive and non-cognitive individual skills on his or her marital outcomes. I find considerable effects of both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities on marriage and divorce outcomes, and they remain significant even after controlling for a number of parental family background and individual characteristics. Estimated effects differ substantially by person’s gender and race, and their manifestation seems to vary by age or time since marriage. Findings from marriage hazard regressions suggest that not only cognitive and non-cognitive abilities make individuals more attractive marriage partners, but they also affect the timing of marriages. Divorce analysis results for women are consistent with the view that individual’s personal abilities play an important role for marital problems solving and adapting to changing conditions, thus leading to more stable marriages, while divorce regression results for men suggest that the effects of these skills on the probability of divorce are at least partially manifested through gradually revealed information about spousal quality.
Modeling the dynamic effects of work experience on intrahousehold resource allocation. Access pdf here.
This paper analyzes intrahousehold allocation decisions in a repeated dynamic game between two married individuals. Two extreme cases are considered: collective maximization of the family welfare and a complete failure of cooperation within the family. In this simple intrahousehold allocation model each family member may choose how much time to work and how much time to spend in the household activities. Work in the market increases individual productivity through “learning by doing”, while work at home results in the production of household public good. A genetic algorithm is used as a search method for optimal solution paths in both the cooperative and uncooperative game settings. Non-cooperative behaviors results in inefficiently low provision of household public good and failure of specialization. Potential policy interventions to reduce welfare loss in the case of non-cooperation are discussed.
Since the beginning of my graduate studies I have taught the classes listed below. These courses were taught at the University of Washington to both Econ Majors and students from other disciplines.
Independent Instructor
Principles of Microeconomics (Economics 200), Winter 2008, Winter 2009
Principles of Macroeconomics (Economics 201), Fall 2008
- Taught classes of about 40 students
- Prepared lecture notes and other materials
- Developed course syllabus and chose course textbooks
- Prepared problems for homework assignments, quizzes, and exams
- Graded quizzes and exams
Teaching Assistant
For Prof. Silberberg, Principles of Microeconomics (Economics 200), Winter 2004
For Senior Lecturer Salehi-Esfahani, Principles of Macroeconomics (Economics 201), Spring 2004
- Facilitated 2 discussion sections of about 25 students each
- Answered student questions and prepared problem sets
- Advised students during office hours
- Proctored and graded quizzes and exams
Primary Teaching Interests
- Principles of Microeconomics and Macroeconomics
- Labor Economics
- Applied Microeconometrics
- Population Economics